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NOTES ON CHAPTER XXXVI, PAGES 312-315

particular fact tended to promote dissension. There were three groups of states — the north, the centre and the south; and the first and the third felt that their interests had always been sacrificed to those of the centre. This paragraph and most of the other paragraphs of the present chapter are of course to be read in the light of what has already been said. For this one may refer to the index.

Some readers may feel that the author is inconsistent in saying (vol. i, p. 116) that Mexico wanted the war and here that she was not really in it; but (1) many persons desire things which they feel unwilling later to pay for, and (2) the course of the war was very different from that which Mexico had expected. The nation desired the uprising against Santa Anna, December, 1844, but was soon dissatisfied with the results of it.

5. Sedgwick, Corresp., 1, 150; Kenly, Md. Vol., 391; Encarnacion Prisoners, 69; Stevens, Stevens, 145.

6. Balbontín, Invasión, 135-6. Scott, Mems., ii, 466. 13Doyle, no. 1, 1848. Memoria de. . . Relaciones, Jan., 1849. Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 242. 13Bankhead, no. 86, 1847. Sierra, Evolution, i, 376. 76Mora, Apr. 28, 1847. Monitor Repub., Nov. 8, 1847. Id., Nov. 30, 1847 (Uraga). Apuntes, 347. México á través, iv, 698.

Judging Santa Anna one must allow for the facts that his subordinates were incompetent, and that neither he nor they had known what real armies and real wars were. But this condition of things was far more due to him than to any other person. It should be remembered, too, that while the Americans had numbers against them, they possessed the advantage of the offensive. But this, again, was very largely the fault of Santa Anna.

7. (Kendall) Wash. Union, Mar. 1, 1847. 257C. to F. Markoe, Jan. 3, 1847. Our commanders never had enough troops to garner the fruits of victory. 256Scott to Marcy, Jan. 16, 1847, priv.: "For God's sake give me a reinforcement of 12,000 regulars, at the least, for a sure and uninterrupted march from Vera Cruz upon the city of Mexico.' Upton, Military Policy, 215: If Scott had had 15,000 regulars after Cerro Gordo he could have taken Mexico City. If troops, vessels, etc. had been supplied promptly, there would have been no battle of Cerro Gordo (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 908).

8. Scribner, Campaign, 21.

9. Polk's Diary contains ample evidence regarding the character of his administration; e.g. May 16, 19; June 23-4; Aug. 18; Sept. 22, 24, 18416; Aug. 19, 23; Nov. 10-1, 1847; Jan. 24, 1848. (Period) Lalor, Cyclopædia, iii, 864. As Taussig says (Tariff Hist., 122), our prosperity from 1846 to 1860 should not be attributed solely to the tariff of 1846. London Examiner, Jan. 2, 1847 ("Polk has been the greatest of American conquerors, the most successful of American diplomatists," and yet his recent Message does not boast). Curtis, Buchanan, ii, 72. Schouler, Hist. Briefs, 138 (Dallas said of Polk: 'He left nothing unfinished; what he attempted he did").

Our problem was hard. The report of the quartermaster general, Nov. 24, 1847, said that our nearest dépóts were farther from the source of supply than Algiers from Marseilles, yet we had accomplished more in a few months at the beginning of the war than France had accomplished in Africa in seventeen years (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 549). Polk's relations with Pillow offer a curious problem in psychology and in morals; but one sees from his diary how deeply Buchanan's cleverness impressed his plodding