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CHAPTER II.
Of Simple Ideas.
Uncompounded appearances.§ 1. The better to understand the nature, manner, and extent of our knowledge, one thing is carefully to be observed concerning the ideas we have; and that is, that some of them are simple, and some complex.
Though the qualities that affect our senses are, in the things themselves, so united and blended, that there is no separation, no distance between them; yet it is plain the ideas they produce in the mind enter by the senses simple and unmixed: for though the sight and touch often take in from the same object, at the same time, different ideas, as a man sees at once motion and colour, the hand feels softness and warmth in the same piece of wax; yet the simple ideas, thus united in the same subject, are as perfectly distinct as those that come in by different senses: the coldness and hardness which a man feels in a piece of ice being as distinct ideas in the mind as the smell and whiteness of a lily; or as the taste of sugar, and smell of a rose. And there is nothing can be plainer to a man than the clear and distinct perception he has of those simple ideas; which, being each in itself uncompounded, contains in it nothing but one uniform appearance or conception in the mind, and is not distinguishable into different ideas.
The mind can neither make nor destroy them.§ 2. These simple ideas, the materials of all our knowledge, are suggested and furnished to the mind only by those two ways above-mentioned, viz. sensation and reflection. [1]When the understanding is once stored
- ↑ Against this, that the materials of all our knowledge are suggested and furnished to the mind only by sensation and reflection, the Bishop of Worcester makes use of the idea of substance in these
