Page:The Works of John Locke - 1823 - vol 01.djvu/66

11.	It is not always conscious of it.
12.	If a sleeping man thinks without knowing it, the sleeping and waking man are two persons,
13.	Impossible to convince those that sleep without dreaming, that they think.
14.	That men dream without remembering it, in vain urged,
15.	Upon this hypothesis, the thoughts of a sleeping man ought to be most rational.
16.	On this hypothesis, the soul must have ideas not derived from sensation or reflection, of which there is no appearance.
17.	If I think when I know it not, nobody else can know it.
18.	How knows any one that the soul always thinks? For if it be not a self-evident proposition, it needs proof.
19.	That a man should be busy in thinking, and yet not retain it the next moment, very improbable.
20–23.	No ideas but from sensation or reflection, evident, if we observe children.
24.	The original of all our knowledge.
25.	In the reception of simple ideas the understanding is most of all passive.
CHAPTER II.
OF SIMPLE IDEAS.
SECT.
1.	Uncompounded appearances.
2, 3.	The mind can neither make nor destroy them.
CHAPTER III.
OF IDEAS OF ONE SENSE.
SECT.
1.	As colours, of seeing; sounds, of hearing.
2.	Few simple ideas have names.
CHAPTER IV.
OF SOLIDITY.
SECT.
1.	We receive this idea from touch.
2.	Solidity fills space.
3.	Distinct from space.
4.	From hardness.
5.	On solidity depend impulse, resistance, and protrusion.
6.	What it is.
CHAPTER V.
OF SIMPLE IDEAS BY MORE THAN ONE SENSE.