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CHAPTER II.
No Innate Principles in the Mind.
The way shown how we come by any knowledge, sufficient to prove it not innate.§ 1. It is an established opinion amongst some men, that there are in the understanding certain innate principles, some primary notions, χοιναι εννοιαι; characters, as it were, stamped upon the mind of man, which the soul receives in its very first prove it not being, and brings into the world with it. It would be sufficient to convince unprejudiced readers of the falseness of this supposition, if I should only show (as I hope I shall in the following parts of this discourse) how men, barely by the use of their natural faculties, may attain to all the knowledge they have, without the help of any innate impressions; and may arrive at certainty, without any such original notions or principles. For I imagine any one will easily grant, that it would be impertinent to suppose the ideas of colours innate in a creature, to whom God hath given sight, and a power to receive them by the eyes, from external objects; and no less unreasonable would it be to attribute several truths to the impressions of nature, and innate characters, when we may observe in ourselves faculties, fit to attain as easy and certain knowledge of them, as if they were originally imprinted on the mind.
But because a man is not permitted without censure to follow his own thoughts in the search of truth, when they lead him ever so little out of the common road; I shall set down the reasons that made me doubt of the truth of that opinion, as an excuse for my mistake, if I be in one ; which I leave to be considered by those, who, with me, dispose themselves to embrace truth wherever they find it.
