war with safety to themselves, till malt and land were mortgaged, till a general excise was established, and the dixième denier raised by collectors in red coats. And this was just the circumstance, which it suited their interests to be in.
The house of Austria approved this scheme with reason; since, whatever would be obtained by the blood and treasure of others, was to accrue to that family, while they only lent their name to the cause.
The Dutch might perhaps have grown resty under their burden; but care was likewise taken of that, by a barrier-treaty made with the States, which deserves such epithets as I care not to bestow; but may perhaps consider it, at a proper occasion, in a discourse by itself[1].
By this treaty, the condition of the war with respect to the Dutch was widely altered; they fought no longer for security, but for grandeur; and we, instead of labouring to make them safe, must beggar ourselves to make them formidable.
Will any one contend, that if, at the treaty of Gertruydenburg, we could have been satisfied with such terms of a peace, as we proposed to ourselves by the grand alliance, the French would not have allowed them? It is plain they offered many more, and much greater, than ever we thought to insist on when the war began; and they had reason to grant, as well as we to demand them, since conditions of peace do certainly turn upon events of war. But surely there is some measure to be observed in this; those who have defended the proceedings of our
