proves impracticable. As if princes and great ministers could find no way of settling the publick tranquillity, without changing the possessions of kingdoms, and forcing sovereigns upon a people against their inclinations. Is there no security for the island of Britain, unless a king of Spain be dethroned by the hands of his grandfather? Has the enemy no cautionary towns and seaports to give us for securing trade? Can he not deliver us possession of such places as would put him in a worse condition, whenever he should perfidiously renew the war? The present king of France has but few years to live by the course of nature, and doubtless would desire to end his days in peace. Grandfathers, in private families, are not observed to have great influence on their grandsons; and I believe they have much less among princes: however, when the authority of a parent is gone, is it likely that Philip will be directed by a brother, against his own interest, and that of his subjects? Have not those two realms their separate maxims of policy, which must operate in the times of peace? These, at least, are probabilities, and cheaper by six millions a year than recovering Spain, or continuing the war, both which seem absolutely impossible.
But the common question is, if we must now surrender Spain, what have we been fighting for all this while? The answer is ready: we have been fighting for the ruin of the publick interest, and the advancement of a private. We have been fighting to raise the wealth and grandeur of a particular family; to enrich usurers and stockjobbers, and to cultivate the pernicious designs of a faction, by destroying the
