although clogged with the demand of an equivalent, which will owe its difficulty only to this treaty.
But let me now consider the treaty itself: among the one and twenty articles of which it consists, only two have any relation to us, importing that the Dutch are to be guarantees of our succession, and are not to enter into any treaty until the queen is acknowledged by France. We know very well, that it is, in consequence, the interest of the States, as much as ours, that Britain should be governed by a protestant prince. Besides, what is there more in this guaranty, than in all common leagues offensive and defensive between two powers, where each is obliged to defend the other, against any invader, with all their strength? Such was the grand alliance between the emperor, Britain and Holland; which was, or ought to have been, as good a guaranty of our succession, to all intents and purposes, as this in the barrier treaty; and the mutual engagements in such alliances have been always reckoned sufficient, without any separate benefit to either party.
It is, no doubt, for the interest of Britain, that the States should have a sufficient barrier against France; but their high mightinesses, for some few years past, have put a different meaning upon the word barrier, from what it formerly used to bear, when applied to them. When the late king was prince of Orange, and commanded their armies against France, it was never once imagined, that any of the towns taken should belong to the Dutch; they were all immediately delivered up to their lawful monarch; and Flanders was only a barrier to Holland, as it was in the hands of Spain, rather than France. So in the grand alliance of 1701 the several powers promising
