sort, pass upon a question, we do not think you need to go outside of Tennessee to find law, when it is upon the very issues involved in the case, in regard to the construction of statutes. I would like to read from 142 Tennessee, ex rel Thomason vs. Temple, it says:
"A few elemental rules in the construction of statutes support our conclusions.
"A statute is to be construed so as to give effect and meaning to every part of the statute"—
They can not take the first part of the statute and leave off the last, which Mr. Darrow endeavored to do here the other day in his great speech—
"—And words may be modified, altered, or supplied so as to obviate any repugnancy or inconsistencies."
Now, if our legislature had the intent to prohibit teaching in our schools that man descended from the lower order of animals, they would not have to put that last clause on there, that explains the whole thing, and from that the court can, and could, define the section, as to what the intent of the legislature is. Reading further from Thomason vs. Temple:
"In 36 Cyc. 1111, it is said; 'For the purpose of determining the meaning, although not the validity of a statute, recourse may be had to considerations of public policy, and to the established policy of the legislature as disclosed by a general course of legislation.'
"And in Grannis. vs. Superior court, 146 Cal, 247, 79 Fac., 893, 106 Am. St. Rep, 26, it is said: 'The provision of the code must be construed with a view to effect its objects, and when the language used is not entirely clear, the court may, to determine the meaning, and in aid of the interpretation, consider the spirit, intention and purpose of a law, and to ascertain such object and purpose.'"
What is the purpose of this law? It is to prevent the teaching in our schools that man descended from a lower order of animals, and when he taught that, as has been proven by our proof in chief, he violated the law, and cannot get around it.
"'Consider the spirit, intention and purpose of a law, and to ascertain such object and purpose may look int ocontemporaneous and prior legislation on the same subject, and the external and hisorical facts and conditions which led to its enactment.'"
Now, in the case of Norris vs. People, Fourth Colorado Appeals, 136, a statute was construed which penalized any person who should, by false representations, "obtain a credit, thereby defraud any person." It was held that the word "and" should be supplied before the word "thereby," the court saying:
Construing a Statute
"An insignificant alteration in the phraseology, or the omission of a word of this description in the adoption of a statute of another state, or in the revision of a statute, does not necessarily imply any intention to alter the construction of the act. It is equally settled that wherever there is an apparent mistake on the face of a statute the character of the error may often be determined by reference to other parts of the enactment, which may always be legitimately referred to in order to determine its legitimate construction."
In other words, in that last clause of this act, the legislature set forth their intention what they intended to do; that is just as plain as can be.
The Court—Now, if I understand you correctly, Mr. Hicks, you say when the state proved that he taught—that uou insist that the state proved that he taught that man descended from a lower order of animals, and that by implication this proof meets the requirement of the first clause of the act?
Mr. Hicks—Absolutely. In other words, in construing that first clause, "to teach," where it prohibits any teacher in any public school, or schools supported in whole or in part by the state, to teach any theory which denies the story of the divine creation as taught in the Bible and then our legislature goes on and explains what that is—"and to teach
