real world, although this is universally true, but that the fundamental fashions of Being themselves which we ascribe to objects, such fashions as are exemplified by past, present, future, determinately possible, or mentally real Being, are, just as ways of possessing reality, logically inseparable, so that we cannot abandon one of these fashions of Being as illusory, without at once abandoning them all, and surrendering, like the mystic, all of our finite distinctions as mere dreams. Thus our world, however many and various its objects, possesses what we may call Ontological Unity, in so far as all its types of Being, concrete and abstract, appear as various aspects of one type of Being. Nor can you sunder any single idea of an isolated real object from the network established by ideas of reality in general. The whole of this world stands or falls together.
Considerations of this sort are by no means stated in
ultimate form, for they have been based upon a provisional
acceptance of the world of common sense, with all
of its classes of facts. Yet only by such provisional
acceptance can we get before us the facts of the empirical
world ready for criticism. What we now see is that all
our human ideas of real Beings form portions of a single
system. All varieties of individuals and of individual
ideas must be subordinate to the unity of this system.
VI
Our criticism of the constitution of this system, as we men conceive it can be made, for present purposes, very summary. We have no right to limit the constitution of universal life by the categories of human experience
