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brother to marry a woman whom another had divorced, whilst the latter was alive.[1] The idea of incest, even in this case, does not appear to have entered Augustine's mind.
I answer, secondly, that according to this method of interpretation, we might say that verse 12, which prohibits a father's sister, by parity of reason, includes a mother's sister, and therefore verse 13 cannot refer to a case already provided for: or, that in Deut. xxv. 5, commanding a man to marry his brother's widow, brother cannot mean brother, as that case has been already provided for in Lev. xviii. 16, and absolutely and totally forbidden as incestuous.
Thirdly, even were we to grant that the prohibition to marry a brother's wife includes wife's sister, still the inferential prohibition cannot be stronger than the original and expressed prohibition. But the expressed prohibition admits of an exception, namely, if the brother die without children, when a man may marry his brother's wife. The inferential prohibition may, therefore, admit of an exception too, and that exception be contained in verse 18, and therefore verse 18 is not superfluous, inasmuch as it expresses an exception not provided for by verse 16, and was given to prevent the inference drawn in modern times; and thus Willett's assertion that verse 18, if interpreted of a wife's sister, is superfluous, is not true.
- ↑ Quæst. in Lev. lxi. Quæritur utrum hoc [Lev. xviii. 16] vivo fratre an mortuo sit prohibitum? . . . . Sed rursus si fratre mortuo intellexerimus prohibitum esse ducere fratris uxorem, occurrit illud quod excitandi seminis causa, si ille sine filiis defunctus esset, jubet scriptura esse faciendum: ac per hoc collatâ istâ prohibitione cum illâ jussione, ne invicem adversentur, intelligenda est exceptio, id est, non licere cuiquam defuncti fratris ducere uxorem, si defunctus posteros dereliquit: aut etiam illud esse prohibitum, ne liceret ducere fratris uxorem, etiamsi a fratre vivo per repudium recessisset.
