that the powers given are confined to men. Thus it will be seen that the exclusion of women from the Parliamentary franchise rests upon judicial decision.
A seat in the House of Commons is denied to women, although there exists no express legal prohibition of the choice by the electors of a woman as their Parliamentary representative. Miss Helen Taylor attempted on one occasion to become a Parliamentary candidate, but her nomination was refused, and there the matter was allowed to rest.
Peeresses in their own right do not take their seats in the House of Lords. Some are of opinion that they are entitled so to do, but it would seem that the principle of the decision in Chorlton v. Lings prevents this.
Apparently no woman is eligible for judicial office. Here, again, no Act of Parliament stands in the way; but the judicial decision above referred to and also the fact that the legal profession is closed to women render impossible the appointment of a woman as judge. This, of course, means that, in addition to being powerless to help in the making of statute law, women have no part in the making of judicial law. Every lawyer knows how largely judge-made law bulks in our legal system. The disability in question is therefore a very serious one. Further, the interpretation of laws affecting both men and women by men only gives an opening for the operation of sex prejudice, which must often result in practical injustice to women.
Not only judge but jury also are men. The old principle that accused persons must be tried by their
