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of property is modified and restricted by the nature of the possession: a man's right in his land is one thing; in his horse another, in his servant another. A man is not allowed to use his horse as he would a log of wood, though both be his own property: he cannot lawfully hack, and cut, and burn a horse as he might a log. The horse is his property to use for his own benefit, in any way consistent with its well-being as an animal capable of suffering and of enjoyment. So also a master has the right of property in his servants, to use them for his own benefit, in any way consistent with their nature as human beings, not only sentient, like mere animals, but also as rational, as accountable beings, having immortal souls. A man may not lawfully use his servants as if they were mere animals, without souls, and irresponsible to God. He may have the power to do so, but he has not the right; and no law can ever
abhorrence. Some months later, in answer to the inquiries of a friend in New-York respecting my language in that conversation, I repeated this expression in my letter. That letter was shown to another noted abolitionist, and by him an extract containing the obnoxious passage was taken and published in several abolition papers at the North and East. This extract has been republished in various papers again and again, accompanied by sundry comments far from complimentary to my good sense, and my character for humanity and for piety. It is called a horrible sentiment, language outrageous, indicative of a mind blinded, a heart hardened and a conscience already seared. Of one distinguished minister at the North it is said, he declared he would never again ask me to occupy his pulpit, since I had uttered sentiments so atrocious: of another it is affirmed that, when told I had so expressed myself, he said he regretted I had preached in his pulpit, but that he would never ask me again. Only last week, I received by mail a paper printed at Hartford, Conn., containing a republication of the obnoxious declaration, together with a pointed intimation that I am morally blinded and hardened, not fit to enjoy fellowship with any church. Now, why all this outcry? What is there so outrageous in the expression I used? The point of comparison was, not the nature or the qualities of a slave and a horse, not the uses to which they might be put; but simply and only the morality of the act of purchasing the one or the other. The most that can be charged upon me is, perhaps, a disregard of good taste in the selection of the object of comparison. It might have been less offensive to a fastidious delicacy, had I, in that hurried conversation, spoken of buying a house or a Bible, instead of a horse; but that is all. There either is sin in slavery, or there is not. Where slavery exists, the right to property in a slave may be sold. The purchase of that right is either sinful, or it is not: if not, then there is no more sin in the mere act of purchasing a servant, than there is in any other purchase, no matter what. The point of comparison is, the morality of the act of purchasing; not the use to which what is purchased is to be put. And yet, because, to convey clearly the idea of my conviction that to such purchase no sin appertains, I happened to select an object for comparison not perhaps in the most refined taste, I am denounced and extensively published as a hard-hearted, unfeeling monster; just as though I had said that a fellow-man, even if a true Christian, when held in bondage, is no better than a horse, and may lawfully be treated like a beast!
