eight of the steam line-of-battle ships of the Duke of Wellington type of less than fifty years ago. The expense does not end with the mere building of a large ship, for, apart from the trained complement, stores, and coal, docks have to be adapted both in length and breadth for cruisers 500 feet long or battleships 80 feet broad. In 1848 there were no snips in the navy over 210 feet long, and in 1890 none over 400 feet. Thus Germany, in the attempt to build ships fit to engage vessels of the Dreadnought type, must necessarily enlarge her existing docks and the accommodation of the Kiel Ship Canal.
The path chosen, however, is one along which Germany will be forced to follow Great Britain with much reluctance. She is bound to involve herself in a very large expenditure, which is merely accessory to fighting strength, and not the provision of fighting strength itself. This expense was certainly not foreseen when the second German Navy Bill was passed in 1900 for an extraordinary expenditure of £94,000,000 by the year 1920 as regards works, and the year 1916 as regards ships. This great effort is being made under the grave disadvantage of heavy expenditure connected with the defence of three important land frontiers, and a drain on resources through the military campaigns in the colonies. Great as are the advantages derived by Germany through the concentration of her navy, it involves the sacrifice of both colonies and distant commerce in face of a Power which can more than hold its own in home waters, and is in a position to attack elsewhere. The present programme of two battleships a year can easily be rivalled by Great Britain. In a few years Germany will cease to enjoy the advantages a new navy confers of a small pensioner or ineffective list, and but little wastage of ships to replace. For fifteen years Great Britain has nearly averaged a programme of three battleships and four to five cruisers, and could have obtained the same results with a smaller programme if the wise, economical method had been
