Thenceforth the history of the growth of British power is the familiar story of the results of the contact of an organized government with semi-barbarous neighbours. That natural process has been going on ever since, and is still going on. As regards the interior of India, we appear to have reached a condition of firmness and stability which nothing is likely to affect But can any man tell when, and in what direction, and how far, we may be compelled to advance our political, perhaps even our administrative, frontier?
The condition of India at the time when we had established ourselves in Bengal and removed our European rivals was eminently favourable to the advance of our power. If the Mogul Empire had been in full life and strength, the task might have been too difficult for us, and our expansion must have been less rapid. Even before the death of Aurungzebe in 1707 the central authority had been greatly weakened. His lieutenants had begun to usurp authority, and the Mahratta force was rapidly rising in the Deccan. The disintegration became rapid when the Emperor's sons fought for the throne. The invasion of Nadir Shah completed it. The power of the Mogul was dissolved. Anarchy and brigandage held sway in the land, and the peaceful portion—by far the majority of the people—were ready to come under any flag that could protect them.
The British dominion in India was the result, then, of great movements in the tides of human affairs in the West as well as in the East. It is noteworthy that both the Government and the men in power on the spot, so far from taking advantage of the favourable currents, set themselves to resist them. In 1784 Mr. Pitt stated that his first and principal object in his India Bill was 'to prevent the Government of Bengal from being ambitious,' and from aiming at further extensions. Hastings had no designs of the kind. At one time he wanted to relinquish all the Northern Circars. Clive, after conquering Oudh, in
