support of an advancing army. Even beyond Kandahar (which is strategically but little stronger than Herat) there is little opportunity for serious check, excepting at the Kojak, until our main line of defence at Quetta has to be faced. Thus it is always well to regard the Herat-Kandahar line as the line of least resistance for India—the line on which defensive strategy is chiefly to be considered and matured. In connection with this, the alternative line from Herat to Quetta viâ Sistan is not to be lost sight of. It is a possibility which must ever be taken into account. The point to be insisted on is that the strategic value of Quetta in these days largely exceeds that of Kabul. Quetta is the real key to India, and, knowing what we know now about 'impregnable' defences, no money and no amount of scientific skill can be wasted that is applied to the purpose of bringing those defences up to modern requirements in the matter of guns and equipment. We should take our lesson from Port Arthur, although the fate of that now historic fortress need not make us nervous. Had the Japanese been inside, and the Russians the besiegers, would the latter ever have taken it?
So far I have roughly outlined the probable progress of a Russian invasion of India. Recent events have placed the probability of such an attempt almost beyond the bounds of possibility for many a year to come. For another quarter of a century we have little to fear. But the Frontier Question we have always with us. It will still agitate a certain class of politicians, and to them it will always be a matter of intense interest to know, under such circumstances, what our reply should be to Russian movement.
We talk easily in the first place of Russian millions in men and money as if we had no millions of our own. Russia, all told, can only muster about 150,000,000 of people. We have nearly double that population (290,000,000) in India alone, and it is with India just now that we are concerned. It is true that of our
