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THE FRONTIER QUESTION

wanting symptoms on all sides that it is the ranks of the officers, rather than those of the men, that are likely to fall in numbers.

If, then, we can ensure troop enough, and guns enough, to meet any problematical force that Russia can put into the field, what should be our military policy for the defence of our frontier? Should we resist à outrance the first violation of Afghan territory? Should we wait till Russia has consolidated her position in Afghan Turkestan—which does not much interfere with us—or should we wait still further till she has overcome Afghan opposition, and is threatening our own borders? All military authorities who know and understand the frontier and the nature of frontier people alike condemn a waiting policy. We must take action from the very first, and there should be a sound understanding with the Amir as to what that action will be. This is necessary for many reasons, but not because we are afraid of a rising in India. There would be no rising, no agitation, even, of much consequence induced by a forward movement on the part of Russia, provided that we made proper use of our power of control over the native press. India generally is essentially loyal, and believes that nothing good is to be expected from Russian rule. It would take a series of very severe reverses to shake the confidence of the native troops in the British 'izzat.' Those who talk about a 'rising' should remember that, even in the dark days of the Mutiny, there was no rising of India generally, or we should not have been there now. Nevertheless, our prestige would demand action, and it is not difficult to forecast what that action would inevitably be. There is not much choice about it. The occupation of Afghan Turkestan would be resisted by the Afghans ineffectually. It would stir up the fiercest spirit of outraged independence amongst the Afghan people, and we should run the risk of snaring more or less the general obloquy if it were not made absolutely clear to them beforehand that we should not, and could not, under any circumstances support a cam-