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Notes
281


P. 134, l. 13. The meaning of the ἐπεὶ appears to be this: the appeal is made in the first instance to popular language, just as it was in the case of ἐπιστήμη, and will be in those of φρόνησις and σοφία. We commonly call Architecture an Art, and it is so and so, therefore the name Art and this so and so are somehow connected: to prove that connection to be “coextensiveness,” we predicate one of the other and then simply convert the proposition; which is the proper test of any logical definition, or of any specific property. See the Topics, I. vi.

P. 135, l. 2. See the parable of the unjust Steward, in which the popular sense of φρόνησις is strongly brought out; ἐπῄνεσεν ὁ κύριος τὸν οἰκονόμον τῆς ἀδικίας ὅτι φρονίμως ἐποίησεν· ὅτι οἱ υἱοὶ τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου φρονιμώτεροι, κ. τ. λ.—Luke xvi. 8.

P. 135, l. 5. Compare the ἁπλῶς and καθ ἕκαστα πεπαιδεύμενος of Book I. chap. 1.

P. 135, l. 35. The two aspects under which Virtue may be considered as claiming the allegiance of moral agents are, that of being right, and that of being truly expedient; because Conscience and Reasonable Self-Love are the two Principles of our moral constitution naturally supreme: and “Conscience and Self-Love, if we understand our true happiness, always lead us the same way.” Bishop Butler, end of Sermon III.
And again:
“If by a sense of interest is meant a practical regard to what is upon the whole our Happiness: this is not only coincident with the principle of Virtue or Moral Rectitude, but is a part of the idea itself. And it is evident this Reasonable Self-Love wants to be improved as really as any principle in our nature.
...So little cause is there for Moralists to disclaim this principle.” From the note on sect. iv. of the chapter on Moral Discipline, Analogy, part I. chap. v.

P. 136, l. 6. See the note on Ἀρχὴ on page 4, l. 30.
The student will find it worth while to compare this passage with the following.—Chap. xiii. of this book beginning ἡ δ ἒξις τῶ ὄμματι τούτω κ. τ. λ.vii. 4. ἔτι καὶ ῶδε φυσικῶς. κ. τ. λ. viii. 9.—ἡ γὰρ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ µοχθηρία. κ. τ. λ.iii. 7 ad finem. εἰ δέ τις λέγοι. κ. τ. λ.

P. 136, l. 15. This is not quite fair. Used in its strict sense, Art does not admit of degrees of excellence any more than Practical Wisdom. In popular language we use the term “wiser man,” as readily as “better artist:” really denoting in each case different degrees of approximation to Practical Wisdom and Art respectively; διὰ τὸ γίνεσθαι τοὺς ἐπαίνους δι᾿ ἀναφορᾶς. I. 12.

P. 136, l. 17. He would be a better Chymist who should poison intentionally, than he on whose mind the prevailing impression was that “Epsom Salts mean Oxalic Acid; and Syrup of Senna Laudanum.”