around him. I. Sat. iv. 105, etc. See also Bishop Butler, Analogy, part I. chap. v. sect. iii.
The whole question of the Selfish Morality is treated in Bishop Butler's first three and the eleventh Sermons, in which he shows the coincidence in fact of enlightened Self—Love and Benevolence i.e. love of others. Compare also what is said in the first Book of this treatise, chap. v., about αὐταρκεία.
P. 140, l. 17. More truly “implied,” namely, that Practical Wisdom results from experience.
P. 140, l. 23. This observation seems to be introduced, simply because suggested by the last, and not because at all relevant to the matter in hand.
P. 140, l. 27. An instance of Principles gained αἰσθήσει. (Book I. chap. viii.)
P. 141, l. 1. Particulars are called ἔσχατα because they are last arrived at in the deliberative process; but a little further on we have the term applied to first principles, because they stand at one extremity, and facts at the other, of the line of action.
P. 141, l. 12. I prefer the reading ἡ φρόνησις, which gives this sense; “Well, as I have said, Practical Wisdom is this kind of sense, and the other we mentioned is different in kind.” In a passage so utterly unimportant, and thrown in almost colloquially, it is not worth while to take much trouble about such a point.
P. 141, l. 25.
The definition of it in the Organon (Post. Analyt. I. xxiv.), “a happy conjecture of the middle term without time to consider of it.”
The quæstio states the phænomena, and the middle term the causation the rapid ascertaining of which constitutes ἀγχινοία.
All that receives light from the sun is bright on the side next to the sun.
The moon receives light from the sun,
.·. The moon is bright on the side next the sun.
The ἀγχινοία consists in rapidly and correctly accounting for the observed fact, that the moon is bright on the side next to the sun.
P. 141, l. 34. Opinion is a complete, deliberation an incomplete, mental act.
P. 142, l. 19. The End does not sanctify the Means.
P. 142, l. 28. The meaning is, there is one End including all others; and in this sense φρόνησις is concerned with means, not Ends: but there are also many subordinate Ends which are in fact Means to the Greet End of all. Good counsel has reference not merely to the grand End, but to the subordinate Ends which φρόνησις selects as being right means to the Grand End of all.
