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in their double list of goods and bads[1]: which philosophers, in fact, Speusippus[2] seems to have followed.

But of these matters let us speak at some other time. Now there is plainly a loophole to object to what has been advanced, on the plea that the theory I have attacked is not by its advocates applied to all good: but those goods only are spoken of as being under one ἰδέα, which are pursued, and with which men rest content simply for their own sakes: whereas those things which have a tendency to produce or preserve them in any way, or to hinder their contraries, are called good because of these other goods, and after another fashion. It is manifest then that the goods may be so called in two senses, the one class for their own sakes, the other because of these.

Very well then, let us separate the independent goods from the instrumental, and see whether they are spoken of as under one ἰδέα. But the question next arises, what kind of goods are we to call independent? All such as are pursued even when separated from other goods, as, for instance, being wise, seeing, and certain pleasures and honours (for these, though we do pursue them with some further end in view, one would still place among the independent goods)? or does it come in fact to this, that we can call nothing independent good except the ἰδέα, and so the concrete of it will be nought?

If, on the other hand, these are independent goods, then we shall require that the account of the goodness be the same clearly in all, just as that of the whiteness is in snow and white lead. But how stands the fact? Why of honour and wisdom and pleasure the accounts are distinct and different in so far as they are good. The Chief Good then is not something common, and after one ἰδέα.

But then, how does the name come to be common (for it is not seemingly a case of fortuitous equivocation)? Are different individual things called good by virtue of being from one source, or all conducing to one end, or rather by way of analogy, for that intellect is to the soul as sight to

  1.    P. 8, l. 1. The list ran thus:—
    τὸ πέρας τὸ ἄπειρον | τὸ εὐθὺ τὸ καμπύλον
    τὸ περισσὸν τὸ ἄρτιον | τὸ φῶς τὸ σκότος
    τὸ ἒν τὸ πλῆθος | τὸ τετράγωνον τὸ ἑτερόμηκες
    τὸ δεξιὸν τὸ ἀριστερὸν | τὸ ἠρεμοῦν τὸ κινούμενον
    τὸ ἄρρεν τὸ θῆλυ | τὸ ἀγαθόν τὸ κακόν
  2.    P. 8, l. 2. Plato’s sister’s son.