the offence, for it is better for any nation to be directed by sagacious and well-informed rogues than by honest imbeciles. The former, at any rate, will not lead the country into situations that imperil not only the whole State but its leaders too. Only a blockhead would do that. The worst case of all is, of course, where dishonesty, frivolity and stupidity are united. The first alternative, therefore, the senility of Szögyeny, if a fact, does not exculpate the German Government; it merely transfers the guilt to another field of its operations.
Was it a fact? In 1914 Szögyeny was undoubtedly an old man, seventy-three years of age, into whose dispatches an error might occasionally creep. Much of what he states has been proved to be entirely correct. In the present instance, as we have already seen, his evidence is remarkably definite. It surely, therefore, calls for examination.
And on closer examination we discover that very important points of his report are confirmed by the German documents.
We find, too, that the motives attributed to Jagow, on which he based his questionable utterance of the 27th July, correspond accurately with the direction of the German Government's thoughts at that period. Szogyeny reproduces their words:
"The German Government considered it of the greatest importance that at the present moment England should not make common cause with Russia and France. Everything must therefore be avoided that might snap the wire hitherto functioning so well between Germany and England. Were Germany to tell Sir Edward Grey plainly that she declined to transmit his wishes to Austria-
