CHAPTER XIII
ITALY
At the time of the dsipatch of the ultimatum to Serbia there still prevailed among the gentlemen who ruled in Berlin and Vienna a reckless self-assurance which believed that victory was already theirs, either diplomatic victory if Russia should submit without a fight to the capitis diminutio intended for her (as William expressed it, meaning her shameful degradation), or military victory if Russia allowed herself to be misled into drawing the sword.
But this assurance was based on the expectation that it would be possible (i) to secure the necessary approval of the German public; (2) to retain Italy as an ally, and (3) to induce England to remain neutral.
Then came Serbia's reply. The more its effect was felt, the more dubious became the general attitude towards Austria and her backers. Thus arose that uncertainty the symptoms of which we have just recognized.
We have seen William's indignation at the "Sozi" (Socialists). His Italian ally had another cause for anxiety in store for him.
Had the conspirators of Potsdam seen things as they really were, and not as they ought to be according to their wishes, they would have understood from the out-set that far from reckoning on Italy's support, they should have been prepared for her hostility.
