the side of Serbia against Austria. But an Italian Government was far less its own master than a German or an Austrian. It dared not risk a conflict with a strongly expressed popular feeling.
In these circumstances the only way to win over Italy might have been for Austria to afford Italy ample compensation, such a compensation as the people also would accept; for example, the cession of the Trentino.
A policy marked by ordinary foresight would have made sure of this point before committing itself to the hazard of war—if it considered war necessary at all. From their own imperialistic point of view William and Bethmann ought to have demanded from Austria the assurance that she was ready to make definite concessions to Italy, before they promised in Potsdam unreserved support to Austria in a war against Serbia.
But they were in too great a hurry for this. The venture which brought about the terrible world-war—was quite apart from all moral considerations—started with such stupidity and levity that in Berlin they did not even think of first binding Vienna to compensate Italy. They never even inquired what were the objects aimed at in a war against Serbia. It was only afterwards that they began to think either about the war-aims or about Italy. Ten days after the Potsdam conference, on July I5th, Jagow telegraphed to Tschirschky in Vienna:
"Just as Italian popular opinion is in general Austrophobe, so it has so far always shown itself Serbophil. I have no doubt that in a conflict between Austria and Serbia it will be pronouncedly on the side of Serbia. A territorial expansion of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, even an extension
