although since the beginning of the crisis it had been Bethmann's most urgent care to put Russia in the wrong, and shift to her the whole responsibility for the coming war.
When the Tsar's telegram came, which recognized Germany's right to mobilize, but contested the necessity that mobilization should mean war, their declaration of war must have appeared doubly unjustified; otherwise we could not understand why they subsequently made the effort once more to prevent the proclamation of mobilization which had not yet been issued. In this they did not succeed; it was ordered at five o'clock. The "civilian Chancellor" was not yet at ease. We have already quoted "Junius alter" to the effect that "after mobilization had taken place, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg made one last effort to obtain the withdrawal of the order; but it was fortunately too late."
This no doubt refers to the following. Although at 1 p.m. the declaration of war had already been sent to St. Petersburg, the Chancellor, nevertheless, at 9.45 p.m. laid before the Kaiser a telegram to the Tsar, in which a way to negotiations was again opened up, and "Willy," as William still signed himself, said:
"An immediate clear and unmistakable answer from your (Nicky's) Government is the only way to avoid endless misery. I must most earnestly ask you to give your troops without delay the order, under no circumstances to commit even the slightest violation of our frontiers."
This telegram, handed in at the General Telegraph Office at 10.30 p.m., nine hours after the dispatch of the declaration of war, is probably one of the most
