seen in this action of the German Government a proof of their love of peace.
Dr. David, for example, thought:
"The German Government undertook the attempt at least to confine the conflagration to the east. This is no small factor to their credit. It was seriously intended. There could be no doubt on this point." ("The Social-Democracy in the World- War," p. 80.)
A man who regarded the German Government with less confidence would probably have cherished doubts as to whether the form of the ultimatum which Germany sent to Paris in the telegram printed above with the demand that a statement on neutrality should at once be made, was that which would have been chosen by anyone who really desired her neutrality. But even the most innocent and trusting spirit must lose all doubts when he learns that this telegram to Schön had an appendix, which the German Government very wisely did not publish, but on the contrary marked "Secret." It was not their fault that this appendix nevertheless became known to the French Government, not long afterwards, when the war was in full swing. It ran:
"If, as is not to be expected, the French Government states it will remain neutral, your Excellency will tell them that we must demand as a guarantee of their neutrality the surrender of the fortresses of Toul and Verdun, which we would occupy and restore at the conclusion of the war with Russia. The answer to the latter question must reach here by to-morrow (August 1.—K.) afternoon, at 4p.m."V. Bethman-Hollweg."
