terrible struggle only one question remained whether Germany's opponents were to bleed to death along with her. In the case of Russia this noble aim has been fully achieved. Not quite so completely did it succeed with France and Italy, still less with England, and not at all with America and Japan, who, on the contrary, gained enormously.
And it is fortunate that the war did not cause the whole world to bleed to death, for who, then, would have been left to feed the victims and to bind their wounds?
From the day on which Belgium decided upon resistance and England entered the war, Germany's position was desperate.
The German General Staff at once recognized this, and drew its conclusions, in its own fashion, there and then. This is proved inter alia by a memorandum which the Chief of the General Staff sent to the Foreign Office on August 5th, and in which the war policy is laid down—a fresh proof that the leader of German policy was now the Chief of the General Staff, and not the Imperial Chancellor, who, henceforth, had only to carry out the orders of the former. The memorandum runs:
“England's declaration of war which, according to reliable information, was intended from the outset of the conflict, compels us to exhaust every means that may contribute to victory. The grave situation in which the Fatherland finds itself makes it an imperative duty to employ every means likely to damage the enemy. The unscrupulous policy pursued against us by our enemy justifies us in sticking at nothing.
“The insurrection of Poland has been prepared.
The seed will fall on fertile soil, for even now our
