the view that the impulse to war could come only from Russia, not from Germany. Ten years after Engels' article I had still named Russia among the European peace-breakers, not Germany. At a later date I would certainly not have repeated this remark. Since then there had taken place, on the one hand, Russia's defeat in the war against Japan, and the Russian Revolution, while, on the other, Germany had started her naval armaments and her active policy in the Mohammedan world.
Russia, with revolution in her midst, had now become less dangerous to the democracy of Europe than the still unshakable, all-powerful German military Monarchy.
And it was no longer at all possible to regard the German or the Austrian Government, the latter of which was ruling without a parliament in 1914, as champions against the Tsarist autocracy.
A revolutionary Russia would have appeared far more dangerous to them than a Tsarist Russia, just as a free Serbia was considered by them as their worst enemy.
Characteristic in this respect are William's marginal notes to a report sent by Pourtalès from Petrograd on July 25th, concerning an interview with Sasonow. Pourtalès writes:
“My reference to the monarchical principle [supposed to be violated by the Serbs.—K.] made little impression upon the Minister. Russia knew, he said, what she owed to the monarchical principle.”
To which William adds:
“No longer, after her fraternization with the French Social-Republic.”
