33S THE HALT ON TIIF. CHAP. III. Causes of the pro- tracted lialt on the Alma ; ami of an inchoate intention to abstain from attack- ing tl)e Nort)i i'orts. Allies were to iiiavch upon the Sevevnayn, or iiovlli side of Sebastopol ; and — not at first harbourinj,' the thought that Marshal St Arnaud would swerve from the purpose with which the Allies had come out — Lord Eaglan deemed it to be of great moment to press on, and at once attack the northern forts, without giving the enemy time to recover from the blow which had felled liim. As expressed — not in language originating with Lord Raglan himself, but by his declared concurrence in the statement of opinion submitted to him by Sir Edmund Lyons, — Lord Piaglan conceived 'that ' the character of the whole expedition was that of ' a surprise, that it was undertaken Avithout accur- ' ate knowledge of the strength of the enemy or ' their resources, and that in great measure they ' [the Allies] still remained ignorant on these ' points ; that all they knew positively was, that ' the victory at Alma had been a heavy blow to ' them, and that the best chance of continued ' success was to follow it up rtipidly, and try and ' take the Northern Forts by a coup-dc-main!*
- MS. Menior.iiidnni of a conversation held with Sir Ednnuul
Lyons on the 10th of February 1856, hy Mr George Loch. The memorandum was phiced in Sir Edmund's liands on the same (Lay, and after lie had read it over, he returned it with a state- ment that it was correct ; and, a note stating that approval having been forthwith made, the paper became, )0 the deatli of Sir Edmund liyons, a valuable and authentic record. Its value was increased by the corroboration which was given to it in writing by the late Duke of Kewcastle.— See Appendix, No. XL, where will lie found all that portion of the memorandum which relatr-s to affairs touched in tliis an<I the next volume. See also tltc accompanying map.
