PLAN OF ATTACKING THE NORTH SIDE. 373 attack at that point.* So far as they went, these chap two arguments were sound, but, taken alone, they ' had not sufficient cogency to warrant the aban- donment of a well- matured plan of campaign. Yet again, it was argued that the capture of the Severnaya or North Side alone, though involving the means of cannonading the Russian ships and their dockyards, would not of necessity carry with it the entire possession of Sebastopol.f To this objection the answer is twofold : for, first, it is clear that the capture of the Severnaya or North Side alone would have enabled the Allies to attain at once the main object of the invasion ; but, secondly, as we have already seen, the operations against the Severnaya might have been easily accompanied or followed by a measure which (unless General de Todleben errs) must have instantly given the Allies the whole of the prize they were seeking. :|: By far the gravest of the obstacles to the plan of assailing the North Side was the want of a safe harbour on that part of the neighbouring coast which was north of the Sebastopol bay. It was said that the attack might take time, and that, pending the operations, the fleets might be so driven from the coast by stress of weather as to put the Allies in peril for their supplies. Of course this fear was one which applied to the idea of attempting any landing at all on the western shores of the Crimea ; and, since it had
- Sir John Burgoyne's Memorandum, jwsl, p. 395.
+ Ibid. J See ante, p. 369 et seq.
