AKMY ruOM SKEASTOPOL. 01 would not be able to hold out long in the town chap. itself.' - ^" Prince Mentschikoff replied, ' The enemy can- ' not undertake an energetic attack upon the ' northern i'ortilications, having our army on the 'flank and rear.'* Persisting in his resolve, he ordered Korniloff to form battalions out of the ships' crews for the defence of the place. There was mucli that seems politic in this plan ti.r con- „ , , . ilitioii put of operations; but the thought of abandoning forward lo , , , justify it. Sebastopol at such a time, and leaving to the sailors the main defence of the place, was only to be justified by keeping it always coupled with that other part of the plan, which provided that the army thus stealing out of the fortress should operate formidably upon the flank and rear of the invading armies; and it will be seen that, al- though this last duty was in terms undertaken by Prince Mentschikoff, he did not make haste to perform it. AVith a view^ to the execution of the intended rieiiminary ' • 1 rr> 1 • 1 1 Operation flank march, Ivinakoff was entrusted with the entrustea to Kiriakoff. delicate and important task of observing the enemy at a very critical time ; and accordingly, on the 23d, the day before the march of the main army, he was sent towards the Belbec, taking with liim, it seems, 12 battalions, 20 guns, and 400 Cossacks.f
- ' This conversation was related by Korniloff on the cven-
' ing of the 11th [23a] of September.' t See the Phin of Flunk March, ante, p. 14, and also the Plan in the ' Invasion of the Crimea,' vol. iii., Cabinet Editioa, p. 340.
