akm'y feo.m sebastopol. 97 taken that day by the Russians must liavc put the chap. Allies in fn-ave dauber. " Such was the occasion which fortune stood Mentschi- proffering to Prince jMentschikoff from the morn- a°^ua";tc,i ing of the 25th of September to the forenoon of n,'ovem«its the followincj day. But she happily proffered in °^^ll. vain ; for during the whole of the 25th, he not only suflered himself to remain in sheer ignoi'ance of the movements of an army of between 50,000 and 60,000 men which had bivouacked at a distance of half an houi-'s ride from his quarters, but was even so content with his state in this respect that he avowedly postponed to the morrow the business of seeking this precious knowledge.* His sloth was the more extraordinary, since it is evident that (either from deserters or from some other source) he had gathered reasons for surmising that the Allies might march to the south j-f yet, even with such added motives for desiring infor-
- 1 am informed, on very liigli authority, that the cause (-f
Prince Mentsclukofl"'s ignorance of the enemy's movements -was his reliance on KiriakofF, and the failure of the operation to liini entrusted ; but the language of Prince MentschikofF's letters seems to me inconsistent with that supposition ; and there arc many reasons which tend, as I think, to make the explanation invalid. ■|- This we know because, almost immediately after quitting Sebastopol, Prince Mentschikoff sent back to the garrison urging precautions which could only be needed on the supposition that the Allies would march to the south. These injunctions, however, disclosed a surmise that the Allies, if they should march to the south, would take the lower road by the mouth of the Tchernaj-a ; for the Prince directed that the passage by tliat route should be obstructed and fortified. He also sent back recommending that efiforts should be made to strengthen VOL. rv. a
