WHEN ABANDONED BY TIIK ARMY. IGl enemy; and the omission to execute that, the chaf vital part of the undertaking, is the thing that ll_ has to be justified. When there is no hope of being able to defend a place for such a time as may allow of the siege being raised by forces coming to its relief, the custom of even the most warlike nations permits and favours surrender ; but for a general, with a field army 30,000 strong, to leave in the fortress some 28,000 brave men, who understand that they are to defend the place to extremity — to assure them that they will have the active support of the field army, which will be assailing the be- siegers in fiank and in rear — to go out by night from the south of the fortress when the enemy is approaching it by the north — to move away to a distance of some eighteen miles from the fortress and nearly as much from the enemy — to remain in that state of seclusion for days and days to- gether, without even knowing or labouring to know where the enemy might be, and in this way to break from the promise which engaged him to aid the defence by pressing upon the enemy in ,the open field, — this seems to be a course of action which, though it may be capable of explanation on grounds connected with the state of the army or its want of supplies,* is not to be excused in all its stages by saying that, in the belief of the
- Todleben, in the place where he says that the main body
of the army remained on the Katcha until the 28th, adds that it was there ' awaiting the supplies which- weie to reach it from
- Sinipheropol' (vol. i. p. 245).
VOL. IV. L
