AND PREPARING. 281 of such a kind— a conflict much dependent upon chap. the speedy construction and the speedy repair '. L_ of earthworks and batteries — that the value of their services must have been hardly less than that of an equal number of soldiers. It was now found practicable to give back to the sailors the system of organisation which divided them into what were called ' crews ' instead of battalions ;* and at about the same time the lines of defence, extending, as we know, to a length of four miles, were divided into four sections.-f* With these forces posted in an entrenched posi- increased hopefulness tion, with a great command of labour, and an all of the " _ endeavour but unbounded command of material resources, to defend SebastoiioL the undertaking to defend Sebastopol was no longer one which could be justly called desper- ate. It is true that a careful and scientific cal- culation of the strength which was likely to be available for the defence of given points in the hour of the expected assault, might still have
- It must not be understood that the force (consisting in
general of about 1000 men) which the Eussians called a 'cre^v,' was the crew of any particular ship. The word imported only an arbitrarily divided portion of the body of seamen belonging to the fleet ; but the organisation which distributed the men into 'crews' was one to which they had long been accustomed, and they were glad to return to it — glad to be once more under their accustomed ' colours.' t Sir John Burgoyne supposed the flanks of the entrenched position to be nearly unassailable ; but the distribution of the troops occupying these four sections seems to show that the chiefs in Sebastopol did not at all share his view. The two sections which comprised the ' front for attack ' were occupied by only one-half of the number which guarded the flanks of the position. — Todleben, p. 272.
