Page:The invasion of the Crimea Vol. 4.djvu/437

This page needs to be proofread.

THE 17TH OF OC'L'OBEK. 40? This security of the fortress from any fresh chap. naval attack was indeed so firmly established by "^^^^^ the engagement of the 17th of October, that it afterwards received a practical recognition from the one man of all the world whose mind would most violently struggle against any such conclu- sion. Until he was recalled from Balaclava to the fleet a few days before the action, Lyons — evidently differing from Dundas — had believed that the navy might take a great part in the reduction of Sebastopol ; but even before the action, his views, as we saw, were much cleared by hearing what was said to him by the English captains of ships ; and after the 17th of October, his opinion upon the question of attacking Se- bastopol became apparently the same as that of Dundas ; for although it was his fate to become before long the successor of the Vice -Admiral, and to hold the command of the fleet until the close of the siege, yet, during the whole of that time, he acted exactly as Dundas had desired to act from the first, and abstained from attack- ing Sebastopol. Whence came all the errors which brought Admiral . (< 1 ^ Hamelin about this ostentatious misuse of naval power we notrespon -■■ sible. have well enough seen. So far as I have learnt, there is no reason for believing that the judgment of Admiral Hamelin was ever astray, or that (ex- cept under the stringent orders of the General who was his commanding officer) he would ever have outraged the English by depriving them of