414 THE CANNONADE OF CHAP, harmony in the Allied camp than a series of ex- torted concessions.* And, after all, though (as viewed by men at that time) the political consequences of a schism between the Admirals might have worn a some- what grave aspect, there, at least, is sure ground for saying that no naval inconvenience could have resulted to the English from the execution of the French threat. Supposing the French fleet to have acted alone and apart, or not to have acted at all, the English fleet would have been set free, with full power to engage in any enterprise which its commander, with the advice of his captains, might think fit to devise; and whatever that enterprise might have been, it could scarcely have failed to acquire the merit of being less impotent than the formal, remote line of battle which Admiral Hamelin proposed. But although Dundas erred when he so far submitted to dictation as to engage to anchor his ships and prolong the French line of battle in the way prescribed to him by Hamelin, it must yet be remembered that the English Admiral did not employ his whole fleet in this distressing and frivolous duty. On the contrary, he not only devoted a choice portion of his force to the at- tack on Fort Constantine and the neighbouring coast defences, but supported the squadron thus detached by the fire of nearly all the steam-ships which he kept under way, and soon reinforced it
- For the two instances of well-timed severity referred to in
the text, see vol. ii. of Cabinet Edition, cliaps. xii. and xx.
