THE BATTLE OF BALACLAVA. 357 suasion that the leadership of his first line was chap. the one task before him, he all at once found ' that of that first line he could see nothing, except some horsemen in retreat, and already a good way up the valley.* It did not, it seems, appear to him that by holding up his sword for a rally he could draw any stragglers to his side, and he had no aide-de-camp, no orderly with him. What was he to do ? f Well indeed might it be said that the emergency was an unforeseen one, for what manual had ever explained how a cavalry leader should act if all the troops he could see were out of nis reach, and he had no one at his side by whom he could send an order ? Even when in the midst of the narrative, I His theory found time to speak — although shortly — of what duty of L Lord Cardigan believes to be the true rule of cumstanced i i • tt • , i • i as he was. cavalry practice. His theory is, that a cavalry officer in command of two or more lines when about to undertake a charge should first give sufficient directions to the officers in command of his supports, and thenceforth address himself
- That the theory was no mere afterthought, and that Lord
Cardigan really considered the leadership of the first line as the one task before him, is shown, I think, by the terms of the private memorandum which he imparted to Lord Raglan on the second day after the battle, and long before controversy began ; for he there described himself as having been ordered to attack— not with the Light Brigade, but — with the 13th Light Dragoons, and the 17th Lancers, i.e., with the regiments constituting his first line. See note, ante, p. 210. + As was said by the Lord Chief Justice, it would be well for men forming opinions upon Lord Cardigan's conduct ' to ask ' themselves how they would have acted in a similar state of ' things « '
