420 APPENDIX. weeks), the numbers with which General Ryjoff com mencod his advance must have been 3400.* Were there then any circumstances which could have materially reduced the numerical strength in the interval between the morning of the 20th of September, and the morning of the 25th of October 1 And first, were there losses in action? Except the four men forming part of Prince Mentschikoff's escort who were knocked over on the day of the Alma, the enemy's cavalry sustained no known losses in action. Were there then any causes such as hard marches, want of food, want of forage, trying weather, or epidemic disease, that might bave reduced the effective mounted strength in the interval? No such causes had been in operation. The cavalry, after moving back from the Alma to Sebastopol, had rested there three full days, had then marched out towards Baktchi Serai, and had ever since enjoyed both repose and abundance — repose and abundance for the men as well as for their horses, and this in a land where they were free from epidemics, and where they were at home, and favoured all the time by the genial weather of the early autumn. Under such circumstances, there was apparently a total absence of all the causes which would have been likely to bring about a material reduction of the ' mounted strength;' and accordingly, until special grounds for a different con- clusion are shown, we may fairly take it for granted that the numerical strength of the. cavalry with which Ryjoff commenced his advance was not far distant from the number before indicated — that is, 3400. From this force General Ryjoff detached a small portion which, under the
- General do Todleben himself .states that at the Alma the 16 squad-
rons and 11 sotnias of Cossacks there acting had altogether a strength of 8600. With this advance of RyjofFs the same 16 squadrons were present, and had with them— not eleven bul nine sotnias oi Cossacks. The 'sot.nia' seems to be generally taken at 100 ; bnt the squadron at the Alnui had a strength of about 166.
