THE BATTLE OF BALACLAVA. 39 the enemy from seizing this vantage-ground, for ciiaI the ridge of Kamara was itself overtopped by '_ crests ranging higher and higher in the direction of Baidar; and it was judged that to attempt to hold more ground would be to add to the weak- ness of this outer line. As it was, the line of inherent these six earthworks extended over a space of of the f 'outei more than two miles ; and Canrobert's Hill was so distant from the ground whence supporting forces might be expected to come, as to offer the enemy a licence of some hours' duration for any enterprise in the plain of Balaclava upon which he might think fit to venture.* The only force immediately available for at- The force rn , immediately temntino - to give any support to the lurks was available foi ro , . . . ., supporting the division of English cavalry, which, along with the Turks, its attendant troop of horse-artillery (commanded by Captain Maude), was under the orders of Lord Lucan. This division of cavalry comprised some 1500 sabres, and was in high order. It lay camped on the southern slopes of the Causeway Heights, at a distance of not much less than two miles from Canrobert's Hill, but it kept an outlying picket at a spot near the heights of Kamara. Such, then, was the outer line of defence ; and this — only this — was the force which, except after
- The distance from Canrobert's Hill to the camp of the
nearest English division of Infantry was only about four miles going straight ; but we shall see that, from the moment of first giving the alarm to that when an English division could he got down to even the more western part of the plain, some hours elapsed.
