cankobert's reason. 83 strained him, according to Niel, and prevented CHAP. his seizing the Mamelon was — not any grave !_ apprehension of the obstacles his troops might Mameion. encounter whilst performing so simple a task, but rather — a belief that the measure would provoke some great sortie directed against the guards of the trenches, thus bringing about an engagement of more or less extended dimen- sions, and doing so under conditions which he judged to be disadvantageous.* Whether sound, The vast or deceptive, the objection was one of vast scope ; ins obj<>(« for, if valid against that proposal of the 10th of March which asked General Canrobert to seize what was then an unfortified knoll, it would seemingly prove no less adverse to any real step in advance that could well be conceived ; for how to carry Sebastopol without doing some act of aggression ? And, how to plan an act of aggres- sion which the enemy, if such were his mood, might not answer with powerful sorties ? And, again, how on earth to contrive that any en- gagement thus generated should take place under conditions well fitted to please the besieger — to please a besieger so circumstanced that, whether lor conquest or whether for safety, he must fight under the guns of Sebastopol, with before him a labyrinth of mighty defences, and behind him the sea and sea-cliffs ? To harbour such an ob- jection whether sound or fallacious was plainly to open a path that led down towards despon- dency; and, although of course none can be
- Niel, pp. 168, 169.
