THE DEFECTION OF PRUSSIA. 313 made it perilous for Austria to fulfil her engage- chap. ments, laid Germany everywhere open to Eussian _ 1 diplomatists, made it even a clear, tempting field for all their decomposing exploits, and soon broke up the Confederacy into Statelets so feebly united that, whilst some of them were consenting, there were others refusing to ' mobilise ' their respective armies, and one at least, if not more, that ingeni- ously found for its troops a happy medium state between being and not being summoned to gather in arms — between standing up and sitting still.* The harm Prussia did to her late — now aban- doned — allies, by laying Germany open to Nessel- rode's emissaries, was of a serious kind ; t for, in its then absurd state of multiplied sovereignties, the country offered intriguers a rich field of action ; and the once famous Eussian diplomatists had not yet been superseded, or robbed of their well- tried power by marplots ranting at Moscow. Prince Bismarck, it seems, in referring to the origin and course of this war, has denied that his country was bound to take a part against Russia ; and no one, of course, should say lightly that the great statesman erred ; but, to weigh his con- tention with any advantage, it is essential to know, step by step, the policy he would have chosen for Prussia from the time when Austria, Prussia, and Germany being all of them treated as nullities, page. Prussia's first overt act of retrogression was a refusal to attend the Conference of the 22d of July, that had been sum moned for giving effect to the Protocol of the 9th of April.
- Called ' Kriegbereitschaf t. '
+ See the Official Diplomatic Study.
