Page:The invasion of the Crimea Vol. 8.djvu/363

ON THE CONFERENCE. 331 be the case with Louis Napoleon in those hours chap. XII when he was not intending to lead his army in L_ person ; for his power of weighing on the Con- tinent by means of an army in readiness for strife on ground nearer his frontiers was suspended, or immensely impaired by the exertions of power he had made and was making in a distant part of the world. So far, therefore, the condition of things gave strength to the Russian negotiators ; but on the other hand, it must be remembered that — because unacquainted with that ' Mission ' of General Niel which was sheltering the Sebastopol garrison from all decisive attacks — they believed the Flagstaff Bastion, and with it the Fortress itself, to be in closely imminent danger; whilst also, we know, they were pressed by the grave, disheartening care of which I am going to speak. The effort required for sustaining this defence of Sebastopol by aid of troops marched from vast distances was one of a cruelly exhausting kind. The stress of the marches alone inflicted losses believed to have reached enormous proportions, and seemed des- tined to be always continuing until the siege should end ; * so that Russia from that point of view might seem to be driven towards peace by painfully cogent motives ; and, when known in St Petersburg, the losses sustained by the Rus- The late Duke of Newcastle (who, however, since February 1855 had ceased to be War Minister) once imparted to me his estimate of the losses which the Russians bij their marches alone had sustained. His estimate was so vast that 1 am unwilling to reproduce it.