464 THE BATTLE OF INKERMAiN. CHAP. But this neutralisation of the Sebastopol gar- rison was not the most signal defect which dis- fti^nce^Gort- closed itsclf iu the practical working of a really wSil ingenious plan. Prince Gortschakoff, as we know, IvoZV'^^^ with his 22,000 men, was to pass into unfeigned activity so soon as he should see the scant forces defending Mount Inkerman overborne and pressed back to the Windmill by their 40,000 assailants ; Its cause, but hour after hour, that single, that small opera- tion upon which so much was to hinge, remained unperformed, and Prince Gortschakoff having waited all day for the one pre-imagined event which was to warrant him in ascending the Cher- sonese, could at last, as he found, do no better than lead back his troops to Tchorgoun. His feints against Bosquet cost him only 15 men in killed and wounded ; and indeed were so weakly pronounced, that the whole of the effort he made was afterwards described by Prince Mentschikoff as a demonstration against Balaclava.* It was natural enough that a general at the head of 22,000 fresh troops, who remained an almost passive spectator of the battle long raging on the wold close above him, should be blamed by those of his fellow-countrymen who did not know why he held back; but it is certain that he was tethered all day by the preciseness of his orders ; for they required him to suspend his advance • ' The troops under the command of Prince Gortschakoff ' made a strong demonstration again.st Kadikoi, and thus kept 'in activity the enemy's detachment at Balaclava.' — Prince Mentschikoff's despatch.
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