56 THE WINTER TROUBLES. CHAP, those seventeen years, the examples that Eng- ' land gave of power effectively wielded by means of land -service troops were few and slight in proportion to the long, long series of ' expedi- ' tions ' in which she wasted her strength. It is plain that all this baffled enterprise was simply what might be looked for as the conse- quence of default in preparatives ; (^) that default in preparatives resulted from administrative weakness ; and finally, that administrative weak- ness, with all its dire consequences to the State and to thousands and tens of thousands of its splendid, neglected soldiery, was the perfectly natural attribute of an official machinery such as that which had long been contended for by our two disputing kings, and between them left scattered in fra;^ments about the streets of London and Westminster. Along with that sentiment of loyalty lor a popular though untoward king, which did cer- tainly then give to patriotism both concentration and strength, the majestic ascendant of the second Pitt was one of the causes to which England owed her decisive resolve, carrying with it great weight on the Continent; and we have almost a right to believe, that with State engines apt for his task, the great Minister would have waged war by laud as well as by sea with the force that belonged to his char- acter ; but a simply instinctive power to choose the best theatre of action, to plan a campaign with wisdom, and to sustain it with vigour and skill, or even with constancy, was not one that
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