Ill PREFACE TO THT: TRESENT EDITION diotant from their ports of embarkation, was to show, though only in sample, that blended command oi resiiurces both naval and military which, supposing it to be ever exerted on the greater scale shown to be feasible, and applied at the right time and [)lace, might well prove ample enough to sway and govern the; issue of even a mighty war.'" Amongst the various criticisms to which the first edition of this volume gave rise, there was one undertaken by the ' Edinburgh Eeview ' which, because contradicting a prominent statement of mine, should be noticed perhaps in this place. Whilst explaining the state of our army ad- ro/inistration, as constituted at the time of the war, I had to show the quaint process by which a general appointed to command in the field, and at first simply owing obedience to his sovereign or his commanding officer, was all at once handed over by an order in writing to the control of another ]3ower, and directed to take his instructions from ' Her ' Majesty's Ministers ;'t but omitting to mention the proof which sustained my account of the transfer, I certainly made it quite possible for a venture-
- See post, p. 63, an allusion to Lanfrey's high estimate of
the power that this 'blended command ' of resources might have enabled England to exercise in even 1809, the year of the Wa- gram campaign. All wU see that that power which Lanfrey aacribed to the England of 1809 has been hugely augmented by ateam. t Post, p. 27.
