APPENDIX. 413 renLly took it for granted that its state long ago must continue to be its state in 1809, and that Napoleon— the most busy of men in other fields of action — had chosen to be idle at Antwerp through- out all the years of his reign ! They also— and on better grounds — thought that both Antwerp and the provinces near it had been much denuded of troops ; and the instructions Lord Castlereaghr based upon that supposition disclosed not only what was abstractedly a Avell-conceived plan, but one well supported by means for carrying it into effect. He explained that the very object the Government had in viev>-, when determining to operate with veiy powerful means, was to enable the commander of the land forces to advance with a part of them swiftly, leaving other troops in his rear to establish his hold on the islands through which he v/ould have to march. Operating promptly with the portion of his army which would thus be set free for swift movement, and acting of course in concert with our navy, Lord Chatham was to take all the measures deemed feasible for intercepting the enemy's fleet in its probable efforts to escape — to escape by ascending the Scheldt and finding shelter in Antwerp ; and besides — acting still Avith the accelerated part of his army — he was to push on with all speed for Sandvliet, where — then on the mainland — he would have been within a day's march of Antwerp. When arraigned for the course of action we shall presently sec him adopting, Lord Chatham's defence, it seems, was that lie had been baffled by Sir Richard Strachan, the admiral in command of our naval forces ; and, indeed, it is sufficiently plain that for this peculiar enterprise— one requiring sliips of war .to operate in a river, and a land force to operate on its banks — close concert between the admiral and the general M^as a condition of vital moment ; whilst, moreover, there is ground for surmising that the maintenance of that exact concord upon which great issues depended had been gravely imperilled beforehand, if not indeed really prevented by the blight — the old bligiit once again ! — the Ijlight of a ' personal ' king ; for the commanders, naval and military, were not only two, but serving in some sort two masters, because the admiral was the genuine servant of the ' State,' whilst the general. Lord Chatham, was a 'Court favourite,' who imagined, as was afterwards proved, that despite the Letters of Service, he might correspond — correspond seci-etly and behind the back of the admiral, and even behind the backs of the ministers —with George, the mere 'personal' king.* Our country had hardly a right to expect smooth, easj'^ accord Ijctween two com- manders of whom one leaned for guidance and sanction on no other power than the 'State,' whilst the other, though also in terms
- See post, another paper. Note 22, relating in part to that matter.
