BETWEEN THE CZAR AND THE SULTAN. G3 Constantine ; he was chilling the healthy zeal of chap. his ablest servants if he lived idle days making ; no approach to the Bosphorus. Upon the whole, it resulted from the various £ ts t j^ solut * motives tending to govern the policy of the State that the ambition of the Russian emperors in the direction of Constantinople was generally alive and watchful, and sometimes active, but was always irresolute. The first Napoleon said, in the early years of this century,* that the Czars were always threatening Constantinople and never taking it; and what he said then had already been true for a long time, and his words con- tinued to be a true description of the Russian policy for half a century afterwards. Evidently it answered the purpose of the Czars to have it thought amongst their own people that they were steadily advancing towards the conquest, but they always suffered their reasons for delay to prevail. They had two minds upon the question. They were willing, but they were also unwilling, and this clashing of motives caused them to falter. At home they naturally tried to make their am- bition apparent — abroad, as might be expected, they were more careful to display the inclinations forced upon them by prudence; but it would seem that this double face was not simply a deceptive contrivance, but resulted from imper- fect volition. The project against Constantinople was a scheme of conquest continually to be de- layed, but never discarded ; and happen what
- ' La Rnssie a trop menace* Constantinople sans le prendre.'
