BETWEEN THE CZAK AND THE SULTAN. 213 the Sultan. Here was the very principle for chap. XIII which France and England had been contending ; '_ and it was obvious that if this concerted action offitaShi. of the four Powers should last, it would ensure colcwtbe- peace: for, in the first place, any resistance to f^pmron their united will would be hopeless ; and, on the other hand, a Prince whose spirit rebelled against the idea of yielding to States which he looked upon as adversaries, might gracefully give way to the award of assembled Europe. Tn short, the four Powers could coerce without making war; and the business of a statesman who sought to maintain the peace and good order of Europe was to keep them united, taking care that no mere shades of difference should part them, and that nothing short of a violent and irreconcilable change on the part of one or more of the Powers should dissolve a confederacy which promised to ensure the continuance of peace and a speedy enforcement of justice. How came it to happen that in the midst of all this harmony there supervened a policy which discarded the principle of a peaceful coercion applied by the whole of the remonstrant Towers, and raised up in its stead a threatening alliance which was powerful enough to wage a bloody and successful war, but was without that more whole- some measure of strength which can enforce jus- tice without inflicting humiliation, and without resort to arms? How came it to happen that within six days from the date of the collective Note, and without the intervening occurrence of
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