Page:The invasion of the Crimea vol. 2.djvu/398

tbe left. 3G8 THE PLAN OF THE ENTERPRISE. CHAP. This will be understood by observing the relative ^^^^' place which the French commander was content to take in the order of march, and by looking at it in connection with what then promised to be the character of the impending campaign. The fate of When oncc the invaders had landed and seized the whole ■,• n • i- Allied army tlic coast-road, the one line or communication dependent . /> t i • i.1. upon the which tlic Kussiaus could trust to for linking the firmness of ■ i i -i that portion oarrisoii of Sebastopol to the mainland was by of it which ■= '- . ~ . Bho'jw^take the great road which passes through Bakshi Serai and Simpheropol. It was vital to the Eussian commander to be able to hold this road, for by that his reinforcements were to come. On the other hand, he had to try to cover Sebastopol ; but such was the direction in which the Allies were preparing to march upon the place that, by manceuvring with his back towards the great road passing through Simpheropol, he could cling to his line of communication, and yet be able to come down upon the flank of the invading armies whilst they wei'e marching across his front. In this way he would cover Sebastopol much more effectively than by risking his communications in order to place his army like a mere inert block between the invaders and their prey. INIoreover, he was known to be relatively strong in cavalry, and the country was of such a kind that the Allies, advancing from Old Fort to the Belbec, would have upon their left a fair, undulating steppe, such as horsemen exult to look upon. It was, therefore, to be expected that the whole stress of the task undertaken by the invaders