happy in the prospect of twelve months' torment? Or, can the repetition of Kaddish afford him any hope of liberation from that place, whither his sins have brought him?
He cannot pretend to have any warrant from Scripture. Where does Moses tell a Jewish child to say Kaddish for his deceased parent, or that the saying of it will deliver the soul from the grasp of Divine justice? And reason does not offer a greater measure of consolation. Reason says plainly, either that the deceased is guilty or not guilty; either, therefore, justice demands that he should be punished or delivered. In the one case the prayer is unavailing, in the other unnecessary. Reason says that God either pardons or punishes; but that there is no middle way. Judaism then offers a hope equally unwarranted by reason and Scripture, and thus, forsaking a poor sinner in the hour of his extremity, is not worthy of the profession of any one who uses his reason, or reveres the Word of God.
No. XXXIX.
ALMSGIVING.
The object of our late numbers has been to point out
the inconsistency and precariousness of the various hopes,
which the oral law holds out to its advocates, and the consequent
inadequacy of a religion which leaves its professors
without a reasonable hope of eternal happiness. In the
course of our observations, the subject of almsgiving twice
presented itself prominently to our notice; first, as a means
of compensating for the sins and omissions of the past year;
and secondly, as a means of promoting the repose of departed
souls; from which it appears that the oral law considers this
duty as most important and beneficial both to the living and
the dead. The object of the present paper shall therefore
be, to inquire into the rabbinic doctrine of almsgiving, and
to compare it with the law and the prophets. The duty
and extent of almsgiving are thus defined:—
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