activity, more prestige to the military authority? No, sire; it would simply have the effect of putting a stop to any direct action on the part of the civil authorities.
The same end may be arrived at without frightening anybody: by remaining in a state of war without deviating from strict legality, and by remodelling the administrative, judicial, and financial staff.
As a corollary to the feeling which urges me to oppose a state of siege, except in urgent cases and exceptional localities, allow me now to add to the general considerations which I have had the honour of submitting to your majesty, some other considerations founded on the peculiar position of the French army in Mexico, now that it has for the last two years restored to the Mexican authorities all the powers which it exercised before the arrival of the sovereign.
Whatever might be my desire of placing at your majesty's disposal all the officers whom you might require, there are limits which I cannot pass.
At a time when a portion of the French army is preparing to quit Mexican soil, I could not, in fact, disorganise its ranks and deprive it of its superior officers, the only ones who possess a sufficient authority for exercising the functions of chief-commandants in the departments in a state of siege.
Still less can I think of removing the superior officers belonging to the corps destined to remain in Mexico.
And, finally, would it be prudent, when two officials of the French army already fill two of the most important positions in the Mexican government—would it be prudent, may I venture to say to your majesty, to augment the share of responsibility which already falls upon us, by allowing us to absorb all the powers in the country, and by thus annihilating all the national elements on which your majesty has hitherto relied, which also may still be made useful?
In a word, the state of siege would become the source of active discontent: it would afford a pretext for general disaffection, which would extend from the sovereign of Mexico (who appeared to despair of his people) to the allied power, whose action would only then be felt by severities imposed by French officers alone; and it would impute to your allies the whole odium of these exceptional measures. The state of
