of things as admitted by our government?—absolutely nothing. But Maximilian, declaring that he was able to maintain his power with his own resources alone, intimidation was tried as a last resource, which, through his decisive refusal to abandon the throne, necessarily changed into reality, for General Castelnau could no longer retract. The Emperor Napoleon, who had fancied this stratagem would be infallible, and was convinced that the abdication of Maximilian would solve everything to his satisfaction, doubtless thought it preferable to make this last threat, which he hoped would soon be shrouded under the veil of oblivion. We shall see directly what menacing language this silence called forth on the part of Mr. Seward. It is nevertheless the case that General Castelnau withdrew from Maximilian the troops which the emperor said were to be left him. This will be seen if we refer to the language of the interview at St. Cloud, reported by the American minister himself, the principal passages of which it will be best to quote:—
Despatch from Mr. Bigelow to Mr. Seward as to the Withdrawal en bloc of the Expeditionary Troops from Mexico during the next Spring.
Sir,—The minister of foreign affairs informed me last Thursday, in reply to a question which certain rumours in the newspapers had led me to put to him, that the emperor contemplated withdrawing his troops from Mexico in the spring, but that he would not recall any corps before that time.
I expressed my surprise and my regret at this determination, so clearly contrary to the assurances given by his excellency's predecessor, both to you through the medium of the Marquis de Montholon, and also to me personally.
The minister fell back upon considerations of a purely military character, not desiring to see, or not estimating at its
